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THE WARRANTY DISCLAIMER v.
MANUFACTURERS' PRODUCTS LIABILITY-
STERNER AERO AB v. PAGE AIRMOTIVE, INC.:
DID THE TENTH CIRCUIT BURY
THE DISCLAIMER ALIVE?
Stephen C. Parker
The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon
the validity of his contract with the person from whom he ac-
quires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer
or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and
his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the
product into the consumer's hands.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment m.
Since Dean Prosser's creation of this concept and its introduction
into case law in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' it has been
frequently assumed or stated2 that the advent of strict liability in tort
("Manufacturers' Products Liability" in Oklahoma)8 sounded the death
knell for the contractual liability disclaimer. Oklahoma's Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp.4 followed this wave of precedent, although in
dicta,5 and quoted directly from, section 402A of Restatement
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
2. To name a few: 'The conclusion is evident that, so far as strict liability of the
manufacturer is concerned, no reliance whatever can be placed upon any disclaimer; that
even as to dealers it is beginning to be rejected . . . .," Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Mnm. L. Rnv. 791, 833-34 (1966); "As indicated
by the very term 'strict liability in tort,' proof of negligence is unnecessary, and there
is no room for application of such traditional contract or warranty defenses as... dis-
claimer of implied warranties ... ." R. HusH, AmamcAN LAw OF PRODuCTS LLMUTYIv
348-50 (Cam. Supp. 1973); "Moreover, this [strict tort] liability could not be dis-
claimed, for one purpose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer from de-
fining the scope of his responsibility for harm caused by his products... .," Seely v.
White Mtr. Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1965).
3. 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974).
4. Id.
5. "We recognize that in these areas we embark on judicial innovation and prospec-
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(Second) of Torts, comment m as set out above.6
Professor McNichols' recent analysis of the Kirkland decision,
however, doubted that Manufacturers' Products Liability signaled
the end of the disclaimer in Oklahoma:
One must wonder whether the Oklahoma court would really
allow even a consumer buyer to recover for personal injuries
against his own commercial seller in a bargaining context
where, with eyes open, he has comparatively shopped and
bought Brand X rather than Brand A for a cheaper price
where an "as is" type term is expressly a part of the deal.
Whether Oklahoma would allow recovery is even more ques-
tionable if we posit a commercial buyer or context or, for
that matter, property damage rather than personal injury.7
After the McNichols article, but prior to a determinative ruling in
the Oklahoma courts, the Tenth Circuit was called upon to decide the
fate of the disclaimer and in Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc.,"
held that a disclaimer provision, although otherwise valid, was not ef-
fective to bar an action based upon Manufacturers' Products Liability.
Was McNichols hasty in his conclusion that disclaimers, or their
equivalents were still healthy, or was the Tenth Circuit premature in
its attempted burial? The answer lies in an analysis of the new case
law in this area9 and in resolution of some fundamental policy ques-
tions.
The initial starting point is: Should the Uniform Commercial
Code ever be applicable in a products liability factual context? Recog-
nition of a potential conflict began in the mid-sixties with the rapid
judicial expansion of the new doctrine of strict tort, concurrent with
replacement of the old Uniform Sales Act by the Uniform Commercial
Code. Currently, the practitioner is presented with three theories of
tive overruling sometimes the source of criticism as dicta." Id. at 1361. The court then
proceeded to deal with many of the problem areas it felt certain to arise with the appli-
cation of this new doctrine of law in its jurisdiction.
6. Id. at 1362.
7. McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturers' Products Liability
Doctrine-What's in a Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 347, 380 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
MeNichols].
8. 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
9. To date Oklahoma still has the same initial set of Manufacturers' Products Lia-
bility cases as existed when the McNichols prophecy of viability was made: decided on
April 23, 1974, Kirkland v. General Mtrs. Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Moss
v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974); O'Neal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 523
P.2d 614 (Okla. 1974); and decided on May 21, 1974, Seay v. General Elevator Co.,
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recovery for the benefit of a product-injured plaintiff: negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict tort.
This availability of a wide selection of tools is probably not a bad
idea yet it is not illogical to inquire concerning the necessity or value
of leaving open parallel theories in products liability suits. Confusion
could and, indeed, has arisen over which concept to apply. A brief,
non-technical review of the elements of competing strict tort and Code
approaches should serve to clarify the situation.
The basic requirements in a strict tort suit are: (1) proof that
the product was the cause of the injury; (2) existence of a "defect"
in the product; (3) proof that the defect existed at the time that the
product left the control of the manufacturer, assembler, or supplier; and
(4) proof that the defect made the product "unreasonably dangerous"
to the user or his property. 10 It should be noted that the doctrine does
not make the producer an absolute insurer as to every injury caused
by consumption or use of his product. Also, the producer may avail
himself of some defenses similar to contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk.",
The Code alternative is naturally commercial in nature and on its
face seems inapplicable to a tort-injured consumer for it requires: (1)
a contract with express or implied warranties; (2) privity between
plaintiff and defendant (section 2-318); (3) breach of warranty; and
(4) notice of breach (section 2-607). Beneath its commercial surface,
however, the Code offers benefits which make it attractive to the con-
sumer plaintiff. (1) Privity need not be the bar it once was (see dis-
10. It is not the purpose of this comment to explain in detail the strict tort concept.For a view on the rule according to Kirkland see McNichols, supra note 7, at 354-61.
Also instructive is the viewpoint of a reporter for Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
As Wade points out, the difficulty is in devising a short phrase to deal with a multitude
of problems. "Unreasonably dangerous" does not demand that the product be ultra-
hazardous, but it must include at least two kinds of defect: (1) Those due to an error
in the manufacturing process, and (2) Perfectly produced products of inherently dan-
gerous or harmful design. On the other hand, liquor can cause alcoholism, and a 'knife
can cut fingers, yet no one expects to hold a manufacturer liable for those shortcomings.
Finally, in any case, the phrase should not indicate that negligence is required since
strict tort imposes a duty regardless of all due care. Wade suggests that today he might
prefer substitution of the phrase "not duly safe" but that still might not solve the prob-
lem of misconstruing a touchstone phrase that must cover so many basic ideas.
11. This is another "snake nest" area into which this comment will not tread. Suf-
fice it to say that these concepts have been renamed in Oklahoma ("misuse of the
product" and "voluntary assumption of the risk of a known defect," respectively) and
may be somewhat altered from the original common law conception. See McNichols,
supra note 7, at 380-99.
[Vol. 10: 612
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cussion infra accompanying footnote 54), and requirement of notice
within a reasonable time after discovery of breach is specifically flex-
ible for the consumer's benefit. Official comment 4 to section 2-607
notes in part:
A "reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer
is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it
will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is de-
signed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good
faith consumer of his remedy.
(2) Sections 2-314 and 2-315 create the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose that exist even if seller
fails to provide them in the contract. (3) The burden of proof upon
the plaintiff may be easier since one definition of "unmerchantable"-
a charge which will bring the Code into play-is that the product was
not "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This
in theory ought to be less demanding upon the injured party than at-
tempting to prove that the product had a defect rendering it "unreason-
ably dangerous."1  (4) The Code provides a more generous statute
of limations.' 3 (5) And, finally, it permits recovery for more types
of injury: section 2-715 expressly permits recovery for "incidental and
consequential damages," which include "injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." It is thus clear
that the Code can apply to aid the injured consumer in a products liabil-
12. McNichols, supra note 7, at 378, discusses whether it is easier to prove "unfit"
rather than "unreasonable." See also the case of Cornelius v. Bay Mtrs. Inc., 258 Ore.
564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971), where, in a suit utilizing strict tort, the court found for the
defending vendor of a used auto because although the bad brakes on the vehicle were
clearly defective they were not held to have rendered the product unreasonably danger-
ous. In all fairness to strict tort proponents, however, it must be mentioned that two
jurisdictions have recently abandoned the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology to fall
back upon mere proof of a defect: Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) and Glass v. Ford Mtr. Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599,
304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973). To the extent that this new extension of strict tort is
adopted, it should make the burden of proof in tort no more difficult than under the
Code.
13. Unfortunately, for the Code proponents, McNichols' article suggests that in
Oklahoma the five year limitations period may never be extended to a product-injured
plaintiff. McNichols, supra note 7, at 374-75 and n. 120. In addition to Kirkland,
three other recent products liability cases have dealt with the statute of limitations ques-
tion: Moss; O'Neal; and Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1974).
So far, however, the five year period has been consistently denied. A recent New Jersey
case, Heavner v. Uniroyal-Inc., 63 NJ. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973), followed a view that
McNichols had suggested was possible in Oklahoma. The New Jersey court decided that
since the statute of limitations question was based upon type of injury and not cause
of action, then the two year tort period would apply to all products liability cases regard-
less of the theory of recovery used in the pleadings. The Oklahoma cases seem to be
pointing in this direction.
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ity factual situation and, further, it is arguable that in some cases the
Code might be the better approach.
The Code, does, however, offer one extraordinary advantage to
the defending seller: the disclaimer. If a seller follows closely the for-
mula of section 2-316 permitting disclaimer of warranties he can escape
liability. It is at this point that a possible tension between the two theo-
ries becomes a full fledged conflict. Will the carefully-wrought, Code-
perfect disclaimer protect the seller against a cause of action in strict
tort? And, if not, what good is it? Comment m to the Restatement,
supra, and judicial language such as that found in Justice Traynor's con-
curring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,14 or the majority
opinion of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,"; make clear that,
at best, the disclaimer is not favored in tort cases. It is seen as being
contrary to public policy, antithetical to proper allocation of the risk of
product injuries on the producer, and therefore not available as a de-
fense against an action in strict tort.
Of course, under the rules of alternative pleading all the plain-
tiff need do is make out a case under one concept. A defense that
is peculiar to one theory will not bar recovery under an alternative.
The problem is: Should all plaintiffs be permitted to so short-circuit
the Code? Or should strict tort protection be reserved for particular
plaintiffs? It is the thesis of this comment that in at least some prod-
ucts liability cases disclaimers should be valid. The difficult problem
then becomes developing judicial tests for selecting those cases where
a disclaimer should be conclusive, even against a tort suit.
IN DEFENSE OF DIsCLAIMERS
Even Dean Prosser, godfather to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, early recognized the utility of the disclaimer:
Commercially a disclaimer may not be at all an unreasonable
thing, particularly where the seller is not sure of the quality
of what he is selling and unwilling to assume the responsibil-
ity for it, and the buyer is willing to take his chances. Many
goods are quite reasonably sold "as is."'"
Prosser, however, predicted the ultimate downfall of the disclaimer.17
14. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Mnw. L.
REv. 791, 831 (1966).
17. Id. at 833. See quote in note 2 supra.
[Vol. 10: 612
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Professor Shanker, a strong Code proponent, created the classic
case of Hypothetical Scooter Co. v. Nosuch Mfg. Co. which illustrated
a prime example of the disclaimer's utility when the circumstances en-
tail the introduction of a new product with unknown qualities and par-
ticularly unknown risks.'
This imaginary case decided in the court of fiction provides a fine
vehicle for a general discussion of the area. Nosuch Manufacturing
Company had developed an innovative new product in the form of a
plastic, industrial grinding wheel. Due to its recent development, com-
plete testing had not yet been completed and the wheel's capabilities
were as yet undetermined. One critical point was certain, however:
the plastic wheel would cost less to manufacture than the existing stone
wheels. It was this chance to better their competitive market position
that first attracted Hypothetical Scooter. If they could purchase grind-
ing wheels (used to produce the component scooter parts) at a reduced
cost, this saving could be passed along to the ultimate consuming pub-
lic with a predictable increase in Hypothetical Scooter's sales.
The Scooter company expressed interest to the wheel producer,
but Nosuch immediately pointed out that it had sparse experience with
the new plastic wheels in general testing and had done no specific test-
ing of the wheel's utility for grinding scooter parts. One can imagine
the bargaining that took place between these two industrial firms before
a final contract for sale was completely drafted and executed. Much
of it must have centered over the problem area of risk. Hypothetical
Scooter might well have been willing to assume some risk that the prod-
uct would somehow fail to live up to its expectations. They, after all,
stood to benefit greatly if the plastic grinding wheel proved suitable,
Nosuch, on the other hand, probably leaned in the other direction:
while willing to pass their reduced costs on to any purchaser they were
unwilling to assume the full risks of introduction of their new product.
Admittedly, those risks could be awesome. They might include per-
sonal injury (e.g., what if an employee were injured by flying chips
off the plastic wheel or, worse, what if it were later proved that the
plastic dust when inhaled proximately contributed to lung cancer?) It
might involve property damage (e.g., the plastic dust produced from
grinding metal scooter parts might be highly flammable, and replace-
18. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications
Barriers, 17 W. Rs. L. REV. 5, 31-34 (1965) thereinafter cited as Shanker]. His anal-
ysis includes the conflicting opinions of judges "Alpha" and "Zede" and does a good
quick job of summing basic policy arguments for and against the disclaimer.
1975]
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ment of a large plant could bankrupt Nosuch). Finally, there might
be economic loss (e.g., what about lost profits if the dust exploded and
the ensuing fire stopped all scooter production for several months?).
For companies engaged in the daily task of bargaining for risk al-
location this is no topic of idle academic interest; their very existence
may well depend upon the ability to disclaim liability. Additionally,
in the new products area, it is no solution to suggest that the partici-
pants proceed with more caution and market new products only after
adequate testing. That alternative simply takes too long and the com-
petitive edge that newness provides evaporates. Or, the market-place
proves more ingenious than the testing laboratory, and the product is
stressed and fails in some way that was never anticipated by lab tech-
nicians.
Both of Shanker's imaginary companies understood the stakes of
the game well. And, they thought they knew the rules. So they en-
tered into a contract that properly excluded all express and implied
warranties in a form acceptable to the Code's stringent rules. Fortu-
nately, the ensuing imagined damage was not too great. The new grind-
ing wheels shattered after only a few minutes of service and the flying
particles of plastic slightly injured an employee and damaged a number
of the component scooter parts.
According to the prior bargaining rules which honored disclaimers,
the predictable course of events after the failure would probably have
followed an established pattern: Nosuch would go back to the drawing
board to eventually modify or drop the plastic wheels; Hypothetical
Scooter would be off to see its insurer to recover for the damaged parts;
and the injured employee would be filing a claim under workmen's
compensation.
But this all supposes that the courts will also follow the rules that
the players chose to use. What happens if the court does not but in-
stead creates a new tort-based doctrine called Manufacturers' Products
Liability? Essentially, Nosuch will be unfairly surprised and forced to
bear the cost of damages that it previously shifted to its vendee in an
open, mutually agreed upon fashion. This seems particularly objec-
tionable since the risks were clear to both parties and the purchaser
has already had the benefit of accepting that risk in terms of a lower
price on the goods that it has purchased. Now, with the aid of the
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Additional considerations are perhaps more far reaching. Future
parties on notice from prior court rulings may not be unfairly surprised,
but will they continue to operate as before? Or, will the unavailability
of a disclaimer "chill" the introduction and flow of new products to the
marketplace? A final point concerns insurance. Perhaps this can be
used to relieve the manufacturer of his burden, but it is not immediately
clear why it is better for his insurer to bear the risk than the insurer
of his commercial customer. It seems hard to argue against the efficacy
of the disclaimer in the commercial marketplace.
It should not be concluded, however, that the disclaimer is neces-
sarily of less value when the purchaser is an individual consumer. Imag-
ine, for instance, John Public Consumer's search for a used auto for his
wife. She sells Avon products and needs transportation for short trips
around town. The car need not be in excellent mechanical condition
since it will never be used for long trips or high-speed driving. Low price
is John's main objective and this leads him to Cheaper Charlie's, a well-
known local entrepreneur who always sells at a bargain rate. Charlie
explains his economics to John as they walk through the lot: most com-
petitors inspect, repair, and warrant their used cars. But that is expen-
sive so Charlie appeals to that sector of the consuming public more in-
terested in price than safety or reliability. He sells "as is"; faults, frus-
trations, and Excedrin headaches included, but for a significantly lower
price. It is immaterial that John fails to inspect the auto, since the la-
tent defect (a grease and mud covered crack in the steering linkage)
is undetectable.
A short time later the inevitable defect-caused accident introduces
Mrs. Consumer to a neighborhood tree. She suffers personal injury,
all her Avon products (a trunk full of rather expensive perfumes) are
broken and she loses considerable business owing to the combined ef-
fects of lack of transportation (the car was hauled off to improve the
aroma of the local junkyard shortly after the accident) and the time-
lag involved in reordering all of the destroyed merchandise.
Hypotheticals of this sort hatch a swarm of unanswered questions
ranging from proximate cause to assumption of risk. Resolution of
such problems will certainly affect the outcome of any lawsuit. The
point of immediate interest, however, need not sink into the morass of
factual analysis. At issue is the viability of the warranty disclaimer.
In the proposed situation, John P. Consumer bargained freely for ex-
actly what he got. No element of adhesion was present because he
really did have viable alternative choices which, for an affordable in-
1975]
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crease in cost, would have provided the protection he now seeks in a
strict tort cause of action. He has not been surprised or taken advan-
tage of. Further, it is hard to argue that he cannot assess the risks and
cost of this type of occurrence or that it would be less efficient for him
to obtain insurance than for Cheaper Charlie to do so.19
Thus, it is submitted that even in this non-commercial situation,
there are valid reasons for retaining the disclaimer. Perhaps Cheaper
Charlie ought to be held liable for Mrs. Consumer's lacerations, etc.,
but it is much harder to argue that he must bear her economic loss of
business profits. Professor Miller gets to the heart of the issue as he
queries:
[S]hall we be satisfied with giving the consumer the ammuni-
tion to protect himself [the Code with its implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness], or will we protect the con-
sumer from himself?20
With a pro-disclaimer bias now established and the case law anal-
ysis yet to come, it seems appropriate to introduce the villain of the
hour in some factual detail. Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive,
Inc.,21 in addition to being the first federal application of Kirkland, in-
volved the presence of a contractual warranty disclaimer in what is ar-
guably a products liability case. It presents the perfect opportunity for
the notorious comment m of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to full-
fill its prophecy.
The reason that Sterner is only arguably a "products liability" case
(using that term from a tort standpoint) has to do with the identity of
the two parties. Both were business entities engaging in normal com-
19. Actually one could argue that this analysis is not completely correct to the ex-
tent that many consumers probably do not have job disability insurance that would cover
something like Mrs. Consumer's lost earnings while recovering from the accident or her
consequential loss of customers and profit while waiting for a reorder of perfume to
come in.
20. Miller, The Crossroads The Case for the Code in Products Liability, 21 OKLA.
L. REV. 411, 463 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Miller). At least one writer, Twerski,Old Wine in A New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk In The Products Liabil-
ity Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1 (1974), casts his lot to positively protect the consumer. Bas-
ing his analysis on the question of the defendant's duty he urges that although the plain-
tiff may voluntarily and unreasonably assume a known risk, this should still not preclude
recovery in those situations where the defendant had no right to offer the fateful choice
in the first place. "That all this ultimately reflects back on the duty question is clear.
Given the nature of the product and its foreseeable use, is it the desire of the law of
torts to protect the plaintiff from himself-from his own reasonable choice? Section
402A, comment m has answered the question in the affirmative." Id. at 26. "The real
question in each instance is the character of the defendant's act and the scope of liability
we wish to impose on him." Id. at 27.
21. 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 10: 612
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mercial dealings rather than the off-balance combination of individual
consumer v. large manufacturer usually found in such cases. The
plaintiff was a Swedish firm that had contracted to purchase a rebuilt
aircraft engine for one of its planes from the Oklahoma-based manufac-
turing firm of Page Airmotive, Inc.
The contract for purchase had been carefully drawn during the
month preceding execution of the agreement, and it included a stand-
ard disclaimer of "all other warranties or representations express or
implied." Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the complaining
purchaser had successfully negotiated an extension of the express war-
ranty coverage from 90 days to a period of six months, a fact tending
to negate any possible charges of disparate bargaining power or classifi-
cation of the document as an adhesion contract.
Certainly there seems nothing unconscionable about the dis-
claimer in the Sterner situation: arguments about spreading risk or pro-
tecting the weak and innocent would seem to have very little force.
But the Tenth Circuit listened to them anyway. The lower court had
rendered summary judgment for the defendants. The appellate court
reversed and remanded, with instructions that, while the disclaimer
barred recovery on a theory of implied warranty, it did not vitiate plain-
tiff's cause of action in Manufacturers' Products Liability.
Professor Miller in his article written in the pre-Kirkland era under-
stood the implications of a Sterner-type holding: "[Tihe courts which
have sanctioned strict liability are by indirection undercutting a legisla-
tive policy which allows disclaimers, in proper form."22  Since those
words, the Oklahoma court has proceeded with a foot raised in dicta
to step off in the direction against both the Code and disclaimers. And
the Tenth Circuit in Sterner has already disappeared around the first
bend in the indicated path.
BACKGROUND
In the past the courts have not ignored this difficulty,2" but neither
have they clearly articulated a theory for permitting disclaimers to live
22. Miller, supra note 20, at 462.
23. Recognition of the tension between the two competing doctrines has been build-
ing since the sixties and a ponderous amount of material has been written on the subject.
Note, Products Liability: Extension of Warranty Disclaimer to the Non-Purchaser, 27
OiLA. L. Rnv. 284 (1974); Note, Products Liability-Strict Tort Liability v. the UCC-
Nebraska Considers the Application of Strict Liability to Property Damage-Hawkins
Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., 7 CREIGHTON L. Rlv. 396 (1974); Titus, Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 713 (1970); Miller, The Crossroads The Case for the Code in Products Liability,
19751
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
in the world of strict liability. Rather, they have reached the result
indirectly, permitting defendants with disclaimers to escape liability by
finding that the plaintiff really had no cause of action in strict liability
in the first place. This approach, permitting disclaimers by limiting
remedies, has been called (disparagingly) "pigeonholing. '' 24 In prac-
tice, it works to deny strict liability actions to plaintiffs who have suf-
fered some injury other than personal injury or property damage.
This approach was most fully developed by Justice Traynor in
Seely v. White Motor Co.2" A number of courts have followed Tray-
nor's lead in using this technique.2" Oklahoma implicitly recognized this
approach in Kirkland when the court noted the language of the
Restatement:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ul-
timate user or consumer, or to his property . . . . (Empha-
sis supplied). 27
Kirkland, however, did not deal in depth with this problem but rather
issued a computer-like "go to" instruction in favor of Moss v. Polyco,
Inc., 8 and "citations and arguments therein contained."29
21 OKA. L. RFv. 411 (1968) (which is strongly in favor of the UCC being the ex-
clusive remedy in this area); Note, Corporations: Torts: Liability of Manufacturers of
Chattels, 20 OKLA. L. REv. 326 (1967); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966);
Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 69Z (1965); and
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers,
17 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965) (which is one of the most readable of the available ma-
terials).
24. Shanker, supra note 18.
25. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
26. In view of this paper's bias in favor of the disclaimer, it is instructive to note
that the reason that Chief Justice Traynor refused to follow Santor v. A & M Kara-
gheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), in its allowing strict tort to aid a con-
sumer in recovering economic loss was that Traynor favored retention of the disclaimer
in certain situations. Noting first that strict tort was non-disclaimable Traynor then
urged, "[a] consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bear-
ing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however,
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations
unless the manufacturer agrees that it will." 63 Cal. 2d at 15, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 23. Thus the pigeonholing served the dual purpose of protecting the consumer
while still retaining the benefits of the warranty disclaimer in applicable situations.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965); discussed in Kirkland in
521 P.2d at 1358.
28. 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
29. 521 P.2d at 1365.
[Vol. 10: 612
11
Parker: The Warranty Disclaimer v. Manufacturers' Products Liability--Ste
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
DISCLAIMERS & PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Moss, which will be discussed in detail below, did not explicitly
adopt the Seely classification by damages concept. It did, however, re-
fer to a number of cases from other jurisdictions which did deal with
or adopt the Seely technique for pigeonholing by type of injury. Thus,
while the views adopted in Seely 'are probably not the law in Oklahoma,
they are persuasive and potentially open to adoption by some future
Oklahoma decision.
In Beauchamp v. Wilson3" (one of the cases cited in Moss) an
Arizona court found the type of injury determinative in foreclosing the
plaintiff's cause of action in tort. There, the dissatisfied purchaser of
a diesel truck was in direct contract and privity with his vendor, the
retailer, and his contract for sale contained an express warranty. Al-
though Mr. Beauchamp was not in contract with the manufacturer,
International Harvester, that company had mailed Mr. Beauchamp a
warranty. The vehicle, a "tractor" used to pull semi-trailers, was pur-
chased for business purposes and used by the plaintiff for commercial
long-distance hauling. No personal injury resulted, but rather, a series
of annoying breakdowns that finally convinced Mr. Beauchamp that the
vehicle was not suitable for his intended purposes. When the engine
finally "froze," resulting in damage to the product itself, Mr. Beau-
champ brought suit under a variety of theories: fraud; innocent mis-
representation; breach of express and implied warranty; and strict tort.
The remedies requested included recission of the sale and return of
the purchase price and recovery of lost profits.
Unfortunately for the purchaser, the contract warranties were only
for defects in materials or workmanship and it contained a valid dis-
claimer of all warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose."' The jury failed to find sufficient evidence of fraud or mis-
representation, and, in a final blow to Mr. Beauchamp, the trial court
refused to instruct on strict liability in tort. This position was sustained
as follows:
We find no error . . . in the court's refusal to instruct on
strict liability in tort. Mr. Beauchamp purchased a truck
30. 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973).
31. "This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied, including,
without limitation, warranties of MERCHANTABILITY and FITNESS FOR PARTIC-
ULAR PURPOSE, all other representations to the original purchaser, and all other ob-
ligations or liabilities, including liability or incidental and consequential damages, on the
part of the Company or seller." Id. at -, 515 P.2d at 45. Although this suit did not
actually fall under the Code, the purchase having been negotiated in 1967 and the Code
becoming effective in 1968, this language would seem to be a valid disclaimer even under
the Code's stringent rules in section 2-316.
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which he claimed did not function properly and therefore he
sought to recover his commercial losses, namely lost profits
and a refund of the money he paid. The "defects" did not
cause physical harm to persons or property. Under these cir-
cumstances, the doctrine of strict liability in tort is not appli-
cable 82
For support of its analysis, the Arizona court quoted from Justice
Traynor in Seely who again stressed the personal injury aspects in carv-
ing out a place in the law for disclaimers:
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates
that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provi-
sions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but,
rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. 8
The view of the majority in Seely placed the distinction on the nature
of the responsibility a manufacturer undertakes in distributing his prod-
ucts. For physical injury caused by product defects he is held to a very
high standard and is subject to suits under strict tort doctrines; however,
no manufacturer is to be charged with any risk that the product will
fail to match the vendee's economic expectations absent a specific
agreement to that effect. It becomes apparent that type of injury is
the new and vital element in the Beauchamp analysis. Although the
Arizona court did notice the contractual privity and intended commer-
cial use to which the product was ultimately put, these elements were
secondary to the fact that the suit was not for recovery of damages for
personal injury.
A similar result was reached by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc.84 There, a contractor,
as lessee of scaffolding equipment, sought to recover from the lessor
and the manufacturer when the scaffolding collapsed. His injuries
were limited to the cost of replacing the damaged structure and the cost
of replacing the allegedly defective scaffolding. The court held that
it was error to submit the case to the jury on a theory of strict tort li-
ability since no personal injuries were involved.
An instructive sidelight on the difficulty in classifying types of in-
jury was provided in Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor
Co. 5 The facts were complex. Ford had sold a vehicle to the plain-
32. Id. at--, 515 P.2d at44.
33. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 13, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965): quoted in
515 P.2d at 44.
34. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
35. 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972).
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tiff's insured, a private individual. The vehicle's braking system failed,
causing an accident in which the insured was at fault and resulting in
a successful claim against the plaintiff, Hawkeye Insurance Company.
Hawkeye successfully sued Ford for indemnification, and Ford cross-
petitioned against the Kelsey-Hayes Company, supplier of the defective
brake. Ford pleaded several alternative theories of recovery including
a warranty theory and a cause of action in strict tort products liability.
The lower court refused to allow consideration of the warranty theory
and Ford, after losing in strict tort, appealed once again. The Iowa
Supreme Court appeared to rely upon general policy considerations in
its determination that both strict tort and warranty theories should have
been allowed in the case:
Recovery under a theory of strict liability in tort results from
a public policy decision that protects the consumer from the
inevitable risks of damage or harm brought about by mass
production and complex marketing conditions. Thus, strict
liability in tort serves a necessary purpose. [Citation omitted].
The cross-petition here . . . is between two corpora-
tions in a commercial setting, involving a contract, and is es-
sentially a commercial transaction. As stated in Farr [citation
omitted], "The laws of warranty still meet the needs of com-
mercial transactions and function well in a commercial set-
ting."3 6
How should one characterize the type of damages sought by Ford
in its cross-petition for indemnity? In Iowa, it may not matter since
the Iowa court did not choose to adopt Seely's classification and cate-
gorization by type of injury, but if such a system is applied, it would
seem that Ford was seeking indemnification for "economic loss." If
this view is taken, Hawkeye is inconsistent with Seely, Beauchamp, and
Hawkins, cases which refused recovery in strict liability for "economic
loss." However, at least one court has managed to arrive at a view
of the indemnity payment that would permit reconciliation between the
cases. The federal district court in Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 3 7 was of the following opinion:
The Court believes that in the Hawkeye series fact situation,
where indemnity is being sought by intermediate tortfeasors
[Ford] against the party ultimately responsible [Kelsey-
Hayes], the damages must be characterized as they would be
if being sought by the original injured party [citation omitted].
Thus, the damages in the Hawkeye cases would be character-
36. Id. at 382.
37. 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
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ized as damages for physical injury to the person and to other
property-as they would be characterized in the original ac-
tion by the tractor driver.38
The problem of loss classification culminates with the distinct pos-
sibility of multiple types of losses flowing from one defective product
incident. Must the pleadings be severed and tried under separate legal
theories? Or will the predominant damage serve to characterize the
entire loss? These difficulties in classifying injuries inspired a fresh
analysis by Professor Franklin.3 9 He breaks the possibilities down into
five groups: (1) personal injury, (2) physical property damage (to
property other than the product), (3) "repair loss" (to the product it-
self), (4) "expectation loss" (loss from product's failure to perform in
addition to the costs of repairs), and (5) "fitness loss" (a non-defective
product loss caused by failure of item to match purchasers' special ex-
pectations-see Code section 2-315).40
This classification system is preferable in that it permits a more
rational treatment of property damage. Most courts allow a plaintiff
to recover in strict liability for "property damage" without distinguishing
between the two types of possible losses. It would seem that damage
to "other property" (e.g., the defective auto brakes cause damage to
plaintiffs rear garage wall) is perhaps within the ambit of risk which
a defendant should be forced to bear, whether he agrees to or not.
Damage to the product itself, however, more nearly approaches a com-
mercial situation and is the kind of risk which should be subject to bar-
gain.
Another advantage to Professor Franklin's system is that it avoids
classifying loss of wages due to personal injury as an "economic loss."
A lost job due to a product-caused injury could be inadvertently
grouped into the "economic loss" category along with other types of ec-
onomic loss such as rental cost of a replacement product or lost business
profits. In other words, to avoid difficulty, the courts would have to
classify all economic loss arising out of personal injury as a personal
injury loss. Professor Franklin achieves this result more simply, by
creating the category of "expectation loss," and defining it as "loss from
the product's failure to perform."
This discussion suggests the difficulties in "pigeonholing." First
38. Id. at 30.
39. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-fective Product Cases, 18 Sr. L. REv. 974 (1966).
40. Id. at 980-81.
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the plaintiffs injuries must be classified; then his remedies must be de-
fined; then if the court decides that recovery in strict liability is not
available, the defendant's disclaimers are good. Complicating the sit-
uation further is the reluctance of courts to admit that that type of in-
jury is the true determinant. Courts gratuitously discuss the "commer-
cialness" of the transaction or stress the corporate character of the
plaintiff, but it all boils down to type of injury.
The real difficulty with this approach to sustaining disclaimers,
however, is not that it is difficult to apply-which it is-but that it does
not necessarily guarantee that those disclaimers most deserving of pro-
tection will be upheld. The result depends on the nature of the plain-
tiff's injury rather than on the situation in which or for which the dis-
claimer was negotiated.
The Sterner court had this background before it when it made its
'decision. It also had five Oklahoma cases on products liability, none
of which, however, dealt with disclaimers; indeed, only three concerned
the Code at all. In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp. the plaintiff
lacked privity and breach of warranty was not even raised. Privity was
also lacking in Seay v. General Elevator Co.41 The plaintiff in Atkins
v. Arlan's Department Store42 tried both Manufacturers' Products Li-
ability and an implied warranty cause of action although the latter was
apparently not under the Code. Though non-contractual in nature,
the case might possibly have met the privity requirements of UCC sec-
tion 2-318(A) since the ten year old plaintiff was a freind of the son
of the purchaser of the "Lawndart" game and apparently playing as a
guest (and arguably as a reasonably foreseeable user) at the time the
dart with its 13-inch metal shaft struck him in the eye. Unfortunately,
this aspect had no chance for consideration due to the court's ruling
that the dart did not have a defect in design, was-like numerous other
products--dangerous only if improperly used, and hence left the plain-
tiff subject to a demurrer for failing to state a cause of action against
the defendants in either warranty or strict liability.
In O'Neal v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co.,4 3 the plaintiff-
employee was injured while using a product manufactured by the de-
fendant and sold to plaintiff's employer. 44 The court indicated that a
suit under the Code would have been appropriate:
41. 522 P.2d 1022 (Okla. 1974).
42. 522 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1974).
43. 523 P.2d 614 (Oka. 1974).
44. The case report itself does not make clear the relationship between the injured
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The only possible recovery based upon "implied warranty"
is under a Uniform Commercial Code violation when the same
has been properly pleaded. . . . Since in the instant case no
attempt was made by the Plaintiff to plead facts which would
bring the UCC into play, his cause of action has been defeated.
45
This is probably the strongest indication available that the UCC
does have some applicability left in products liability cases in Okla-
homa. It should be noted, however, that in O'Neal the plaintiff lacked
privity and so would not have been able to sue for breach of warranty
in any case despite the court's encouraging dicta to the contrary.
The Oklahoma case with the most to offer in the way of guidance
was Moss v. Polyco, Inc.46 Skimpy as it was, the Moss opinion in-
cluded Oklahoma's most thorough discussion of the place of UCC war-
ranty actions in a strict liability scheme. More important, Moss cited
most of the disclaimer cases discussed above-a fact which should have
guided the Sterner court.
The plaintiff in Moss was a restaurant patron injured in a fluke
accident in the restroom. A plastic bottle of drain cleaner somehow
dislodged from a shelf and the cap came off allowing the corrosive con-
tents to spill onto her person. In her suit for personal injury (and her
husband's suit for loss of consortium) Mrs. Moss alleged that the de-
fendants (manufacturer and supplier of the article) had constructed a
defective product and were hence liable for breach of an implied war-
ranty that the container and cap were proper for the use for which they
were intended. The crux of the case was a statute of limitations prob-
lem. In Oklahoma the statute of limitations for tort injuries is two
years;47 five years for UCC actions;48 and 3 years for contract actions.40
The Mosses instituted suit twenty-eight months after the injury-causing
event, so the question was whether the Mosses had a cause of action
under the Code so as to be entitled to the longer statute of limitations.
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's ruling for the plaintiff
and held that the case sounded in tort, not in contract or UCC.
In support of its holding the court spent a page discussing the in-
plaintiff and the defendant. McNichols' additional research provides that data which
shows the surprisingly inconsistent fact that the plaintiff would have fallen prey to the
privity requirements of section 2-318. McNichols, supra note 7, at 376.
45. 523 P.2d at 615.
46. 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95, "Third" (1971).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (1971) (providing for a 5 year period).
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95, "Second" (1971) (allowing 3 years).
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terplay between Manufacturers' Products Liability and UCC breach of
warranty. The first and most significant rule in Moss was to severely
limit the applicability of UCC warranty theories by restricting recovery
only to plaintiffs in near-perfect privity.
Section 2-318 of the Code deals with the disfavored subject of
privity. The official comment explains:
The purpose . . . is to give [certain beneficiaries] the bene-
fit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the con-
tract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any
technical rules as to "privity."50
To facilitate legislative determination as regards privity, three alterna-
tive sections are provided, and, in the notes, an express caveat of draft-
er's neutrality allows for unfettered development of local case law. De-
spite these expressions of drafter's intent, and predictions to the con-
trary,"' the Oklahoma courts flatly refused to extend privity beyond al-
ternative A (the most limiting) as selected by the legislature. That
version extends sellers' warranties to natural persons in the family or
household of the buyer, or guests of the household if it is reasonable
to expect that such person will use or consume the goods. Alternatives
B (any natural person) and C (any person) successively extend the
remedy to wider classes, ultimately embracing plaintiffs, including cor-
porations, who have no relation to the seller whatsoever.
The support offered in Moss for this restrictive interpretation is
not necessarily persuasive. Initially the court points out that the legis-
lature did have the three alternative choices, and this, the court sug-
gests, indicates that the selection of the narrowest view was a de facto
expression of intent. In fact, the legislature did not have this variety
at the time it acted. The UCC was adopted in 1961 in Oklahoma, but
alternatives B and C to section 2-318 were not introduced until 1966.52
To the extent that the possibility of amendment is always open, the leg-
islature's failure to extend section 2-318 to either of the new alterna-
tives may evince some sort of intent. However, the argument is not
quite as convincing as if the three really had been available initially.
Finally, as the McNichols article points out, there is surprising in-
50. UNwonm Col MBECIX CODE § 2-318, Comment 2 (1966 version).
51. "The Code's express neutrality on this point [privity] makes it unlikely that the
action of a state legislature in enacting the Code can be taken as an expression of legis-
lative intent in favor of the retention of the defense of privity." Rapson, supra note
23, at 698 n.30.
52. Reitz and Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?,
46 TEmP. L.Q. 527, 535 (1973).
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consistency in this deference to legislative intent about privity when the
judiciary had previously chosen to ignore the Code in creating its new
tort doctrine.53
These criticisms notwithstanding, for the time being,"4 Oklahoma
will have to live with alternative A. No plaintiff can benefit from the
UCC unless he is in contractual privity with the defendant or fits the
household-family-guest test which that alternative demands. 5
Despite Moss' limitation of Code applicability by restricting privity,
the court was at pains to point out that there are cases where both UCC
and Manufacturers' Products Liability can be pleaded, and in these
cases Code disclaimers are valid, at least against the Code cause of ac-
tion. The court in Moss said:
Should a contract, valid under the UCC limiting plaintiff's
right to recover damages for certain items of damage exist
however, we know of no reason why such a contract could
not be given consideration in the same action in which plain-
tiff seeks recovery under the doctrine of Manufacturers'
Product [sic] Liability when the two matters are clearly dis-
tinguished by proper instructions.56
The Sterner court appears not to have considered this aspect of Moss.
The Moss court also stressed the commercial nature of warranty
actions. The court asserted, "[tihe UCC has to do with commercial
transactions [citations omitted] and presupposes a buyer in privity with
with a seller . . . . 5 Later in the same paragraph the court noted
53. 27 OKLA. L. Rnv. 347, 372.
54. Oklahoma in its stand is still in the slim majority of some 29 states that have
adopted alternative A. The remaining jurisdictions, however, have extended coverage
to alternatives B, C, or their equivalents, or completely dropped the section. See Reitz
and Seabolt, supra note 52, at 535. Further, of those 29 states, at least three (Ala.,
Fla., and NJ.) have recent case law indicating that the need for privity will be loosely
construed. See the cases cited at 552-53 of the 1970-74 cumulative supplement to R.
ANDERsoN, ANDERsON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, (2d ed. 1974). See also
Cochran, Emerging Products Liability under Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Survey, 29 Bus. LAw. 925 (1974), which has an up-to-date appendix on each
state to include judicial modification by case law.
55. One effect of this decision to stick with alternative A was to require the over-
ruling of a previous Tenth Circuit case that had supported an extension of section 2-
318. Speed Fasteners, Inc., v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967) was noted in
the Oklahoma statutes (1971 construction to section 2-318 of title 12A) as follows,
"This section [2-318] does not have the effect of excluding all those not within the men-
tioned categories." The Oklahoma court dealt with that unauthorized extension at 627
of the Moss case. "Mhe employee would have an action based on the principle of
Manufacturers' Products Liability. In our view, the UCC provisions adopted by the
Legislature do not extend coverage to him."
56. 522 P.2d at 626.
57. Id. at 625 (emphasis supplied).
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that "[w]arranty recovery applies to loss flowing from the commercial
transaction."8 Is the concept of commercial transaction to be a test
for the availability of Code actions and Code defenses? Moss does not
define "commercial transaction." Arguably, one isolated sale by a
manufacturer to an individual could meet the test. On the other hand,
perhaps what was meant was a continuing course of dealing, or a large
transaction, or a commercial plaintiff.
While the actual holding in Moss limited the UCC only by requir-
ing strict privity, these repeated references to "commercial transac-
tions" raise the question whether the commercialness of the situation
will be of importance in Oklahoma. At the very least it suggests that
the Sterner court should not so cavalierly have assumed that Oklahoma
courts would permit a strict liability action for an industrial plaintiff like
Sterner Aero.
STERNER-THE TENTH C-RCUIT'S EXTRAPOLATION
It must be conceded at the outset that Sterner put the Tenth Cir-
cuit in an unpleasant situation. Judge Doyle was being asked to apply
a body of state law that had not yet been fleshed out into a coherent
framework. Specifically, in none of the five Oklahoma cases had the
use of a warranty approach actually been allowed, nor had the plaintiffs
been anything other than individuals, and finally, only personal injuries
had arisen from use of the defective products. Nevertheless, Moss, as
has been discussed in detail, did establish some guidelines.
The complaining Swedish firm had purchased the allegedly defec-
tive product, a rebuilt aircraft engine, from an Oklahoma manufacturing
firm. A deliberately drawn contract for sale included express warran-
ties for the first 100 hours or six months of operation. It also included
a disclaimer of all other express or implied warranties. Not until a year
after purchase and very near the end of the engine's useful life did a
problem arise: the engine failed during take-off and the plane made
a forced landing in a lake. Injuries were specifically stated as not per-
sonal. However, the case does not make clear whether the suit for
$50,000 was strictly for damage to the engine itself (repair damage)
or damage to other property, such as the plane.
The original suit was brought upon dual theories: breach of im-
plied warranty and negligence, in which the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur was invoked. At the trial level, Judge Bohanon granted sum-
58. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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mary judgment for the defendants based upon the existence of the war-
ranty disclaimer, and his determination that section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts did not apply:
The Court knows of no law which prohibits knowledgeable
parties from agreeing upon the terms of a warranty of mer-
chandise or materials sold. This is not a case between an
ordinary purchaser of consumer goods who relies upon the
expertise and knowledge of the seller or manufacturer. The
parties to this had an equal bargaining position, and could
contract upon such terms and conditions as they saw fit. 0
But Kirkland had just been decided and Circuit Judge Doyle im-
mediately turned to its doctrine of Manufacturers' Products Liability as
an alternative remedy for the plaintiff.60 The pertinent parts of the
Tenth Circuit's decision were divided into three sections, one dealing
with each possible theory. Turning first to warranty, the court found
the plaintiff's recovery barred by the contractual disclaimer, "which, be-
ing clearly expressed and entered through negotiation between parties
of relatively equal bargaining power, would be legally permissible in
Oklahoma."61 In fact this conclusion was probably incorrect in Okla-
homa. The contract in question was executed in 1968, after Oklahoma
had adopted the UCC but it would appear that the wording actually
used in the contract was insufficient to meet the strict requirements for
disclaimers enumerated in section 2-316.Y2 Thus, the Code, if prop-
erly applied, could possibly have yielded the same plaintiff's verdict that
a suit in strict tort offered.
In discussing a possible suit in warranty, the Sterner court repeated
the now familiar litany that:
59. 499 F.2d at 711.
60. At the trial level, Manufacturers' Products Liability was not used as a cause of
action since it was not then available. This required the Sterner court to also decide
that, "[ihe products liability law established by it [Kirkland] operates prospectively as
to all cases set for trial after April 23, 1974 and must therefore apply to the present
action upon remand." Id. at 713.
61. Id. at 712.
62. The exact wording of the disclaimer was: "This warranty is expressly in lieu
of any and all other warranties or representations express or implied." Id. at 711. The
other implied warranties being disclaimed would have been those of fitness and mer-
chantability but section 2-316 demands a specific formula to be effective. Unless the
disclaimer uses expressions such as, "as is" or "with faults" or otherwise effectively puts
the buyer upon notice of his loss of implied warranty, then there is no valid exclusion
of the warranty of fitness. And to exclude the warranty of merchantability, the dis-
claimer must mention that word itself in a clear and conspicuous fashion. From this
vantage point, then the actual disclaimer, since it did not mention the magic words, prob.
ably would have been deemed ineffective under the Code.
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Breach of implied warranty is no longer an appropriate rem-
edy for recovery in products liability cases, except as pro-
vided in the Uniform Commercial Code. The implied war-
ranty theory is now merged... into the theory... of Man-
ufacturers' Products Liability.63
The "merger" language merely refers to the historical fact that as
products liability doctrine developed, recovery was often predicated
upon an implied warranty (often created by the manufacturer's adver-
tising and representations) said to be running with the product into the
hands of the ultimate consumer. It was this implied warranty theory
that Traynor finally mutated into a pure tort doctrine no longer requir-
ing express representation for reliance thereon. Thus courts, including
Oklahoma, have felt the need to clarify the semantic problem and
distinguish between the old superseded concept of (tort) implied war-
anty and the still valid concept of implied warranty under Code sections
2-314 and 2-315. More significant than Sterner's reference to Kirland
is its ommission: the next sentence of Kirkland directed the reader to
Moss and its pertinent comments on Code applicability.64 Sterner
failed to refer to Moss at all.
The court was well aware of the conflict between disclaimers and
strict tort. The stated issue was, "whether this exclusion of all other
warranties, express or implied, effectively barred the present action,
even though a tort . . . ,,65 The answer concluded that a contrac-
tual disclaimer was no bar to the liability created by strict tort doctrine:
"The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that traditional concepts of
contract law are inapplicable in Manufacturers' Products Liability
cases." 66  And for conclusive support, an accompanying footnote
quoted the pertinent portions of section 402A Restatement (Second)
Torts comment m even as the Kirkland decision had done.6 7
The third section of the Sterner decision dealt with the effect of
the disclaimer upon a negligence theory of recovery. Although the in-
stant disclaimer was held to have failed "for lack of explicit language
evidencing intent to exclude a negligence action, ' ' rs the rule adopted
was that by a sufficiently clear intention, one party could exculpate him-
self from the consequences of his own negligence. The only additional
63. 499 F.2d at 712-13.
64. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
65. 499 F.2d at 711.
66. Id. at 713.
67. Id. at 713 n.2.
68. Id. at 714.
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requirement was that the parties be on a parity as to bargaining posi-
tion. Since the two tort approaches were still open and unfettered by
the warranty disclaimer, the case was remanded for development of
facts to support each theory, the court concluding that material issues
of fact still existed and that the trial court's action in granting summary
judgment had been premature.
Given that the facts were new and that no Oklahoma precedent
exactly in point existed, it is not possible to tag the Sterner decision
as absolutely incorrect. However, the decision did not give full atten-
tion to the information available in Moss nor did it examine all the dis-
tinctions between Sterner and the five available state strict tort cases.
The most important distinction was that Sterner was the first Ok-
lahoma case where a UCC remedy was available. The privity require-
ments of restrictive alternative A (Code section 2-318) were met.
The parties to the lawsuit were in direct written contract and clearly
a suit could be brought under the Code. Also, the situation must have
met the "commercial transaction" language so prevalent in Moss re-
gardless of the precise definition of that term. Both vendor and ven-
dee were engaged in a continuing course of business dealings, and the
contract for the allegedly faulty engine was simply a normal part of their
respective operations.
Clearly, a Code remedy was available to the plaintiff. The ques-
tion is whether a strict liability remedy, free of the defense of dis-
claimer, should also have been provided. Here, too, Sterner was dif-
ferent from prior Oklahoma cases, but here the difference militated
against recovery.
Could the court really say, as Oklahoma had done in Moss,
that, [t]he plaintiffs' causes of action are logically related to the
policies and the purposes which caused us to recognize in
Kirkland... the existence of strict liability in tort.., the
policy... of spreading the loss which occurs from defectively
manufactured goods to the manufacturer, and from him to the
public generally who purchase [the] goods . . . ?69
One expects the commercial firm to be able to bear the risk of disap-
pointment in some of the contracts it enters into and the value of re-
allocating the risk from one insurer or corporate income statement to
another is questionable.
As to characterization of the plaintiff, Sterner Aero was not an in-
dividual but a business entity, and although it could be considered a
69. 522 P.2d at 625.
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consumer of products, it was also a party to a bargained-for contract
for sale. Emphatically, Sterner Aero was not a helpless consumer at
the mercy of the whims of mass production and the market place.
The Tenth Circuit did deal briefly with this last point and con-
cluded that status as a corporate entity would not foreclose its use of
the strict tort doctrine. Particular attention was paid to Sterner's status
as a mere consumer of aircraft engines and its possible lack of exper-
tise in this area. Even admitting both contentions, however, the court
still missed the point: strict tort was developed to aid the normal in-
dividual consumer not business entities.70
The final distinction between Sternar and the Oklahoma prece-
dents was injury classification. All five of the state cases dealt exclu-
sively with personal injury. Admittedly, section 402A does envision al-
lowing recovery for personal and property damages. But as noted pre-
viously, type of damage is not a sole determinative factor, and when
combined with the additional aspects such as commerciality, a strong
case exists for exclusive applicability of the Code. Consider the pre-
viously discussed Arizona case of Beauchamp (unsuitable diesel trac-
tor) where recovery in strict tort was denied. On material points, the
Beauchamp and Sterner cases are similar: in both, the dealing was
commercial (Mr. Beauchamp purchased the truck for commercial long-
distance hauling); a written contract and direct privity existed in both
cases; neither involved personal injury (Beauchamp is properly cited
as an "expectation"-economic-loss case while Sterner apparently is
"repair" loss and that is a significant distinction). Yet in Beauchamp
the disclaimer survived as that court refused to apply strict tort to such
a situation.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.71 which was
decided by the California Appellate Court almost concurrently with
Seely, provides an exact parallel to Sterner. California, however, de-
70. E.g.: "The rationale for such a rule (strict tort) is founded upon public interest
in human safety. .. .," Kirkland v. General Mtrs. Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362; or "The
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves," Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901; or the language used by the California court
in Seely, see text accompanying note 33 supra. This is not to say that a corporation
may never properly use strict tort. For instance, a firm in the position of a bystander
which had received "other" property damage due to the failure of a defective product
of another business entity might well need strict tort since it would have no cause of
action in warranty. But such were not the facts in Sterner.
71. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
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termined that strict tort would not apply. More important, the Delta
case has been variously interpreted as pointing toward a new solution
to the strict tort-disclaimer controversy, a subject to be dealt with
shortly.
In Delta as in Sterner, the subject matter was aircraft equipment,
specifically, a new DC-7 plane worth over two million dollars. Natu-
rally, Delta and the manufacturer (Douglas) were in direct contractual
privity. And, as is common to many commercial situations, the contract
contained an "exculpatory" clause purporting to waive liability for all
express or implied warranties (other than those in the contract) and
for liability due to negligence on the seller's part.
In a test flight shortly after delivery, the front nose wheel failed
to function properly during a landing, and the plane veered off the run-
way and was damaged. No personal injury resulted so suit was brought
for cost of repair only.
California adopted the same rule of law as did the Tenth Circuit
concerning disclaimers of negligence. However, the contract in Delta,
by mentioning "negligence" specifically, was held clear and unambig-
uous: "Even though disclaimer clauses are to be strictly construed, still
we find that this clause covers not only contractual warranty liability
but also tort liability."72
Thus barred from a cause of action in negligence or warranty, the
plaintiff turned hopefully to strict tort. The court, however, was easily
able to distinguish the instant case from earlier precedents such as
Greenman v. Yuba Power or the New Jersey landmark of Henningson
v. Bloomfield Motors. Noting that the case did not involve personal
injury, contained none of the elements of inequality of bargaining, and
did not arise out of a "contract of adhesion" the court stated, "we do
not regard the instant case as within either the letter or the spirit of
the authorities relied on."'73
The decision was not left without limitations, as the court pointed
to a variety of factors which could cause an exculpatory clause to be
held invalid. First, the clause might run afoul of the goal of protection
of the general public in a business where absolute limitation of liability
would contravene public policy. This reference apparently was to a
prior California case invalidating exculpatory clauses in connection with




Parker: The Warranty Disclaimer v. Manufacturers' Products Liability--Ste
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
DISCLAIMERS & PRODUCTS LIABILITY
emergency treatment offered to the public at hospitals. 74  Note that it
is important to distinguish between the desirability and effect of dis-
claimers when airline and passengers are involved as opposed to when
only airline and manufacturer are concerned.
Or, an exculpation clause might fail if it were achieved through
inequality of bargaining power or an adhesion contract. But the facts
of this case denied such a situation. In particular, Douglas, the defend-
ant, offered the testimony of the head of its legal department. He in-
dicated that discussions of the exculpation clause had taken place, that
Douglas had removed such a clause in some past transactions for an
appropriate increase in price and finally, that Delta failed to make an
offer in this area because, "they wanted it for nothing."7 5
It is submitted that the California court's parting words could prop-
erly have been applied to Sterner:
In short, all that is herein involved is the question of which
of two equal bargainers should bear the risk of economic loss
if the product sold proved to be defective. . . . We can see
no reason why Delta, having determined, as a matter of busi-
ness judgment, that the price fixed justified assuming the
risk of loss, should now be allowed to shift the risk so as-
sumed to Douglas, which had neither agreed to assume it nor
been compensated for such assumption. 0
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Because it has been virtually the only technique used to reconcile
any conflict in products liability cases between strict tort and the dis-
claimer, categorization or "pigeonholing" has been examined in detail.
It can be made to work; however, it suffers from a variety of problems
ranging from definition of particular types of injury to selection and
weighing of classification criteria. It is bound to be difficult to apply.
It walks that wavering line between selection of tests so rigid that in-
equitable results are bound to flow from its inflexible application, or
reservation of so much discretion that the grey area expands into a vast
morass wherein case law becomes lost in unpredictability with no guid-
ing precedents to follow.
McNichols, in discussing the disclaimer, suggests a second possi-
74. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
75. 238 Cal. App. at-, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 523, n.5.
76. Id. at -, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
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bility.7" Functionally, the disclaimer is in many ways quite similar to
the concept to assumption of risk-a doctrine that will survive the ad-
vent of Manufacturers' Products Liability although under the new title
of "voluntary assumption of the risk of a known defect."' 8  It would
seem that language of the disclaimer variety, slightly modified to be
intelligible to the consumer, would put the purchaser on notice that
something might be wrong with or harmful about the product, thus pro-
viding a basis for the assertion of assumption of risk as a defense.
Although relegating this point to a footnote, a recent federal case70
reached exactly the conclusion presented by Professor McNichols. The
plaintiff had bought a used helicopter with a disclaimer of all warranties
except title. Suit against the seller after the aircraft crashed (note that
the case involved no personal injury) was dismissed based upon the
disclaimer. The pertinent comment by the court was:
There may be still another reason why Keystone may not re-
cover here under either negligence or strict liability theories:
assumption of risk.
It is well established that assumption of the risk is a
good defense to strict liability as well as negligence [citations
omitted]. By purchasing the helicopter "AS IS" Keystone
assumed the risk of product defect.8 0
Oklahoma's Moss v. Polyco, Inc. perhaps suggests a third alterna-
tive. It contains express language that authorizes some sort of liability
limitation: "Should a contract, valid under the UCC limiting plaintiffs
right to recover damages for certain items of damage exist however,
we know of no reason why such a contract could not be given considera-
tion. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).Sl It is not clear, however, that it is
a disclaimer which wins the courts approval. Normally, disclaimers
act to absolutely eliminate all claims for damages. Instead the wording
suggests something more in line with Code section 2-719: Contractual
Modification or Limitation of Remedy. It is provided therein that by
agreement the parties may "limit or alter the measure of damages re-
77. McNichols, supra note 7, at 380. And for his discussion of assumption of risk,
id. at 388-93.
78. 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974).
79. Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. RJ. Enstrom Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D.
Pa. 973).
80. Id. at 1066, n.6.
81. 522 P.2d at 626. Incidentally, this phrase is just another reason why the Tenth
Circuit's Sterner decision with its disallowance of a disclaimer in a commercial situation
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coverable," and this concept is extended to include limitation of conse-
quential damages provided that such would not be unconscionable.
And finally limitation of personal injury due to consumer goods is made
prima facie unconscionable. Thus, the Moss "solution" is less than
ironclad protection for the manufacturer.
Clearly this idea, belonging as it does to the Code, should not be
any more viable against liability in strict tort than is the disclaimer-
what is a defense to suit in warranty is not necessarily a defense to tort
actions. However, if the court were to ignore this point, the limitation
of remedy concept could yield results more beneficial to the injured
consumer. He would never be cut off from his remedy by any agree-
ment yet such agreement could be honored in commercial situations
where the court preferred to promote freedom of contract.
In view of the overwhelming support to the contrary, a final alter-
native to the tension between disclaimers and strict torts is presented:
change the exculpatory clause, expand it, recreate it, but provide some
way to let a contracting party disclaim liability for strict tort. Why can't
strict tort liability be disclaimed? The answer apparently is because
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment m says
so. And because Dean Prosser, Justice Traynor, and a large body of
case law since Greenman in 1962 have concurred. And, basically be-
cause it is believed to be against public policy.
Such a radical proposal needs support and surprisingly a few fed-
eral courts have recently begun to offer it. Interestingly enough, both
sets of cases in one manner or another flow from the intermediate Cali-
fornia court's decision in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.8 2
which has been previously discussed as a case that Sterner ought to
have followed.
The liability claim in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp.83 arose out of the crash of a recently transferred demonstration
helicopter. Both parties to the contract for sale were corporate entities
and the following language was contained in the front page: "Customer
takes 'AS IS' without warranty of any kind except will convey good
title."8' 4 On the back page a standard warranty provision had been
replaced with, "The R. J. Enstrom Corporation will be held harmless
of any liability in connection with sale . . . . [Njo warranty of any
82. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
83. 364 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
84. Id. at 1064.
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kind is made or implied." 85  Suit was for recovery of a variety
of nonpersonal injuries, i.e., "repair" costs and "expectation" loss to in-
clude both lost profit and cost to cover for leasing replacements for two
other sister helicopters grounded during investigation of the crash.
The court found the disclaimer valid and granted the seller's mo-
tion for summary judgment. The plaintiff had tried to plead strict tort
and specifically pointed out that the notorious comment m did away
with disclaimers. Although qualifying their holding to appropriate fact
patterns, the court noted that Pennsylvania law allows disclaimer of li-
ability in both contract and tort. Then came the big step:
For purposes of waiver of liability between two corporations
we perceive no difference between the tort theories of neg-
ligence and strict liability. We see no reason why if, under
Pennsylvania law, parties to a contract in some circumstances
may waive tort liability for negligence they should not be able
to waive tort liability for strict liability as well.80
The federal court then turned to the policy question of whether
waiver of liability in strict tort should be allowed. It concluded that
in "garden-variety" consumer sales the concept of protection of the con-
sumer was still a valid concern and that waiver by disclaimer ought not
be allowed. However, such an argument made no sense in commer-
cial sales situations between two corporations and in those cases, the
court supported freedom of contract to allow the parties to exercise
business judgment as to risk allocation in any way they saw fit.
Basic reliance for this decision was placed on the California logic
of Delta. It should be noted, however, that although Delta would sup-
port the result in Keystone it reached that result by deciding that strict
tort would not be applicable to the facts (pigeonholing again) and not
because strict tort liability could be disclaimed.87
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the decision for the heli-
copter seller in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. Enstrom Corp.88 (here-
after referred to as Keystone I1). The reversal, however, hinged
upon the higher court's feeling that the language used in the disclaimer
may not have been explicit enough to cover liability in strict tort. The
case was remanded for specific analysis of the disclaimer. The actual
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1065.
87. The federal court did cite Delta as allowing disclaimer of strict tort liability,
364 F. Supp. at 1066, and to this extent was incorrect. The state court did allow dis-
claimer of "tort" liability but did not specifically extend this to strict tort.
88. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
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result notwithstanding, Keystone II continued to support the premise
that liability in strict tort could be disclaimed between business entities
of relatively equal bargaining strength:
A social policy aimed at protecting the average consumer by
prohibiting blanket immunization of a manufacturer or seller
through the use of standardized disclaimers engenders little
resistance. But when the setting is changed and the buyer
and seller are both business entities, in a position where there
may be effective and fair bargaining, the social policy loses
its raison d'etre. The transaction then tends to be more in-
fluenced by gravitational pull of the Uniform Commercial
Code than by the consumer oriented § 402A.
Such a limitation on comment m [as provided by the contin-
ued viability of the disclaimer] would avoid the not unfamil-
iar result of "overkill" when a legal principle completely valid
in its original context is extended so far that the mischief
caused may be equal to the original disorder sought to be
remedied. 89
The second pair of cases appear as a nightmarish (for Delta at
least) replay of the California Delta decision. In Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., (hereafter referred to as Delta Federal)90
the facts were almost identical to the earlier state case: the nose gear
collapsed during a test flight causing damage to the aircraft and the
same warranty disclaimer that had barred the California state suit in
1965 was still included in the contract for sale. Only the newer model
of plane, a DC-8 instead of DC-7, and a different airport for the crash
serve to distinguish the facts. And, of course, as the lower federal
court pointed out, Delta now knew what the judicial system was apt
to do with its complaint given the existence of the disclaimer.
Characterizing the parties to the suit as "industrial giants" and
noting as California had done in Delta that "the contract between the
airlines and the manufacturer was not clothed with the kind of public
interest that surfaced in a contract between a patient and a hospital," 91
the court, "agree[d] with McDonnell's contention that the exculpatory
clause is broad enough to include the concept of strict liability in tort."92
The Delta Federal decision did purport to follow California case
89. Id. at 149.
90. 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974), which affirmed the lower court's holding in this
case cited under the same name at 350 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
91. 503 F.2d at 245. And see text accompanying note 74 supra, concerning the
public policy question.
92. 503 F.2d at 245.
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law. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that
Delta was a correct statement of the state law93 and then examined its
specific language. Delta, although not mentioning disclaimer of liabil-
ity in strict tort, had countenanced waiver of "tort liability" for negli-
gence. The federal court then concluded that strict liability was
merely one sub-category of "tort liability" and hence was also disclaim-
able. One could predict that Justice Traynor might disagree but as the
court observed, "Any other conclusion would emasculate the basic pur-
pose of the Warranty Article and exculpatory clause."'94
The Tenth Circuit in Sterner did not validate the particular dis-
claimer with which it dealt. Two items in the decision, however, do
create a negative pregnant of great potential. First, the decision
adopted as law the premise that tort liability for negligence could be
disclaimed if done with adequate care, and, secondly, while discussing
the effect of the disclaimer on the warranty provision the court com-
mented, "[this] waiver would not appear to abrogate plaintiff's right
of action in tort under strict liability, as such a right exists in Oklahoma,
for it does not mention any waiver of strict liability. ' 5  It would be
premature to dwell upon this at great length particularly since no such
implication exists in any of the Oklahoma Manufacturers' Products
Liability cases. Still it is interesting to note that the Tenth Circuit
would, Oklahoma willing, be apparently ready to follow the Third and
Fifth Circuits in their redemption of the disclaimer.
With this final alternative to the disclaimer-strict tort controversy
hopefully supported by a modicum of recent case law, the problem now
becomes one of convincing the courts that limitation of notorious com-
ment m will not work irreparable harm upon the consumer and wipe
out nearly fifteen years of progress.
CONCLUSION-THE RECONCILIATION
The problem, of course, is: if strict liability can be disclaimed,
how can it continue to serve the public policies for which it was cre-
ated? It is believed that it is possible to have both the risk-spreading
advantages of strict liability and the economic incentive benefits of dis-
claimer. Even a "super disclaimer" that is effective to bar liability for
strict tort can be controlled.
93. Delta still has not been distinguished, modified, criticized or reversed.
94. 503 F.2d at 245.
95. 499 F.2d at 712.
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A number of techniques probably exist but the following three can
serve as useful examples. Basically they require a modification, either
by the courts or by the legislatures, of the UCC.
The first possibility looks to classification of the plaintiff for its sol-
kition:
[O]ne method of reconciling those disclaimers and the Code
is to conclude that the Code's disclaimer provisions are inap-
plicable to consumers. Such a method would be justified be-
cause the Code is essentially designed to control commercial
transactions, and merchants' disclaimers are not imposed on
unknowing purchasers .... 96
In other words, allow disclaimers generally, but not when it is a manu-
facturer's disclaimer covering personal injuries arising from the use of
consumer goods.
The immediately preceding suggestion has, for example, been leg-
islatively adopted by Alabama and Massachusetts: the former restricts
section 2-316 (authorizing disclaimers) so that disclaimers are ineffective
against personal injury caused by consumer goods; while the latter
denies use of the disclaimer to the seller or manufacturer of consumer
goods or services. 97
Secondly, the disclaimer section (2-316) could be modified by
reading it in conjunction with section 2-302 (unconscionability). The
section on unconscionability allows the court great freedom of action
including the following possibilities: refuse to enforce the contract; en-
force the remainder of the contract after deleting the unconscionable
clause; or simply limiting the effect of the objectionable clause so as
to avoid an objectionable result. What is suggested is that even a dis-
claimer that was valid as tested by the demanding formulas of section
2-31691 could be ruled "unconscionable" by a court desiring to reach
that result. Thus, rather than the judge-made tort law overriding the
enacted UCC, the two could be reconciled on the point of disclaimers.
And, theoretically, in situations where a disclaimer seemed appropriate,
it could be allowed to stand.
This position, though tenable, has been hotly debated and
is by no means yet decided. Professor Leff, perhaps its major oppo-
nent, comments as follows:
96. Note, Privily Eliminated as a Requirement in Loss-of-Bargain Products Liability
Cases-The Effects of Santor, 19 RuTGERs L. Rlv. 715, 734 (1965).
97. Note, Products Liability: Extension of Warranty Disclaimer to the Non-
purchaser, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 284, 289.
98. See discussion note 62 supra.
1975"I
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
It appears to be a matter of common assumption that section
2-302 is applicable to warranty disclaimers. I find this,
frankly, incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets forth clear,
specific and anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaim-
ing warranties. It is a highly detailed section, the comments
to which disclose full awareness of the problem at hand. It
contains no reference of any kind to section 2-302, although
nine other sections of article 2 contain such references. In
such circumstances the usually bland assumptions that a
disclaimer which meets the requirements of 2-316 might
still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302 seems ex-
plicable, if at all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare
case) attempted sneakinessf 9 (Emphasis in the original).
Yet despite this criticism, a number of courts have indicated that an
otherwise valid disclaimer could still fall to the axe of unconscionability,
and particularly in basically noncommercial situations such a holding is
increasingly predictable. 100
The final possibility is a joint reading of sections 2-316 and 2-719
(limitation of xemedy) of the Code. The latter section provides in
part:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation for in-
jury to the person in case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not.
The technique used to effect the needed reconciliation is to note that
a warranty is in fact an absolute limitation of damages, hence, any dis-
claimer (although otherwise valid under 2-316) that limits recovery of
personal injury in consumer cases is also prima facie unconscionable.
Although seemingly as facile as the previously mentioned combination
of 2-302 with 2-316, this latter marriage is generally disfavored. A
reading of the official comments following section 2-719 discloses the
clear qualifying statement that, "The seller in all cases is free to dis-
claim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316. '"101 Despite
the apparent intent of the drafters, a few courts have permitted mixing
of the disclaimer and limitation of remedy sections to the benefit of
the consumer.102
99. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor'?s New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 523 (1967).
100. J. W=r & R. SUMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 386-92 (1972) deals with this subject in greater detail, including citations
to cases; cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mtrs. Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
101. UNIFORM CoMmaEicmx. CODE § 2-719, Comment 3.
102. E.g., Ford Mtr. Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968).
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Professor Shanker's comments on strict tort and the UCC, al-
though ten years old, are still timely:
Surely, the real lesson of history is more than the fact that
products liability cases have been bound too long in contract
chains forged under the Uniform Sales Act. Rather, is not
the real lesson of history found in the folly of assuming that
products liability cases must be placed in a particular jurispru-
dential pigeonhole and then decided entirely within the
framework of that theory of law?"0 3
Has not the time come to recognize that the business of law
is to determine liability between people and not to place their
claims in pigeonholes? In determining liability, is it too
much to ask of the courts that they consider all relevant legal
theories rather than playing a game of logic with only one? 04
This much is certain: the Oklahoma courts have a temporary
breathing spell in which to consider the problem. And Sterner does
present one easy opportunity when the appropriate factual situation
does arise; it would be possible merely to cite the Tenth Circuit, shovel
a little dirt on the coffin, and let sleeping disclaimers lie. But is this
really acceptable-are the "chains" of tort somehow less objectionable
than those of contract? And, is it really good public policy to do away
with disclaimers entirely in all products liability cases? It is submitted
that the best interests of society are served by the more flexible
approach.
103. Shanker supra, note 18 at 35.
104. Id. at 36.
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